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NOMADIC NOTARIES
MALCOLM L. MORRIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"Residents Only!" With or without the exclamation point, the
message is clear-limited access.
Are such exclusionary
restrictions enforceable? Courts have said that they are.'
Generally, restrictive agreements among private individuals
are permitted under the theory that individuals can determine
with whom they want to associate, provided constitutional
protections are not violated.!
Individual litigants seeking
enforcement of private, resident-based restrictions designed to
prevent access by persons who are members of the public-at-large
are accorded similar protection.3
Not all resident-based restrictions, however, are the product
of private agreements.
Some are creatures of statute or
government rule. It is not uncommon for governmental units to
impose residency-based restrictions.!
Localities may do so to
accomplish a variety of objectives. For example, the goal may be to
limit the use of access to property,5 to provide for reasonable job
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.S.,
Cornell University, 1969; J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1972;
LL.M., Northwestern University, 1977. Professor Morris served as the Official
Reporter for the Notary Code of Professional Responsibility.
1. See generally Zaroogian v. Town of Marragansett, 701 F. Supp. 302
(D.R.I. 1988); McClain v. City of S. Pasadena, 318 P.2d 199 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957); Schreiber v. City of Rye, 278 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1967) (holding that
exclusionary restrictions are enforceable).
2. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Liebler v. Point Loma Tennis Club, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1995) (relying on Nahrsted v. Lakeside Village Condo., 878 P.2d 1275
(Cal. 1994)). The Liebler court upheld a condominium restriction that
precluded non-owners from use of condominium property. The Nahrsted court
determined that such an arrangement between private landowners is
enforceable, provided "it [did not] violate public policy, [bore] a reasonable
relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the
affected land, or... otherwise [imposed] burdens on the affected land that are
so disproportionate to the restriction's beneficial effect that the restriction
should not be enforced." Nahrsted,878 P.2d at 1287.
4. See generally 5 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 19.16 (Clark
et al. eds., 2d ed. 1969).
5. See, e.g., Hyland v. Allenhurst, 372 A.2d. 1133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977).
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requirements or to regulate certain privileges such as the right to
vote.7 States can also impose residency requirements with respect
to those persons who serve as elected officials.8
Can similar restrictions be established for non-elected public
officials, more specifically, for notaries public? Logic would seem
to suggest that appointed officials would be subject to more
stringent control than are elected ones. But that may not be the
case. Whether and why notaries public should be excluded from
residency requirements are legitimate inquiries. A conclusion that
residency requirements are not needed will require that many
state notary statutes be re-written.
II. RESIDENCY RULES:
A.

THE "WHATS" AND "WHYS"

What is "Residency?'

In order to assess the efficacy of notary residency
requirements, it is essential to first define what is meant by
"residency." This is not as simple a task as one might suspect.
There is not any one precise definition of the word that fits all
contexts in which it is used.'0 Different statutes or situations may
require different connotations with respect to the use of the term."
Moreover, sometimes the attempts to define the word serve more
to confuse than to clarify the issue."
6. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-17-22 (1998) (imposing residency
requirements on circuit court judges); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107
(M.D. Ala. 1970); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-8-22 (1997) (requiring applicants for
the state police department to be residents).
7. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 17-43-2121 (1997).
8. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-1162, 14-3701 (Law Co-op. 1998); UTAH
CONST. art. VI § 5 (1953); WIS. CONST. art. IV § 6 (1998).
9. For the purposes of this Article, the terms "residence," "residency" and
"reside" are used interchangeably. Such usage has been recognized by the
courts. See United States v. Twelve Ermine Skin, 78 F. Supp. 734, 738 (D.
Alaska 1948).
10. See Gallup Am. Coal Co. v. Lira, 50 P.2d 430, 431 (N.M. 1935) (stating
that "[t]he words "residence" and "resident" have no fixed meaning applicable
to all cases, but are used in different and various senses, depending upon the
subject-matter.") See also Russell v. Holland, 34 N.E.2d. 668, 670 (Mass.
1941) (providing the following definition of residence:
[t]he word 'residence'... is a word of various meanings and the meaning
to be given it depends on the context in which it appears, and it must be
construed in the light of the purpose of the statute in which it appears
and the result designed to be accomplished by its use.)
Accord McGrath v. Stephenson, 77 P.2d 608, 609 (Wash. 1938), Switzerland
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 213 S.W.2d 161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), and
In re Jones, 19 A.2d 280, 282 (Pa. 1941).
11. United States v. Rubinstein, 166 F.2d 249, 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Calhoun, 566 F.2d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1978)
(approving a jury instruction defining "legal residence" to mean "the
permanent fixed place of abode which one intends to be his residence and to
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The dictionary is often a useful starting point when seeking to
define a word. Indeed, courts often state that one should use a
dictionary or a popular definition of a word unless a statute or
other rule mandates otherwise.13
The dictionary defines
"residence" as "the act or fact of dwelling in a place for some
time." 4 In this context, "dwelling" means to "to remain for a time"
(emphasisadded)." Similar language is used in law dictionaries."
Historically, the courts also have used this approach when
defining "residence," calling it "the place where one actually lives
or has his home," 7 a person's dwelling place or place of habitation 8
or the person's established home. 9
Whereas there is little dispute that residence means one's
"dwelling place," determining how any given location becomes
one's residence may not be easy. Courts consider residency to
involve an element of intent on the part of the would-be resident.
Long ago, in lutts v. Jones, the New Mexico Supreme Court
succinctly explained the role of intention in determining residence.
It stated the common law rule to be:
[tihe question of whether a person is a resident of one place or
another is largely a question of intention, and where the intention
and the acts of the party are in accord with the fact of residence
within a given place, there can be no doubt of the fact that such
party is a bona fide resident of the place where he intends to and
does reside ... (emphasisadded)."
In the context of determining residency, "intention" refers to a
person's state of mind with respect to the relationship between
person and place. Thus, being present at any given place does not,

return to it despite temporary residences elsewhere, or absences" (emphasis

added)). Given that this was a tax case, the use of the word "residence" in the
definition defining "residence" should not be too surprising. After all, the most
basic tax definition of all, that of "gross income," is itself a product of similar
doublespeak. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 (West 1999) (defining "gross income" to be
"income from whatever source derived" (emphasis added)).
13. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing Burns v.
Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)). For state court approval of this
proposition, see People v. Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134, 1136 (Cal. 1993).

14. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1003 (MerriamWebster 1986).
15. Id. at 390.
16. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1308 (6th ed. 1990) (defining

"residence" as the "[pilace where one actually lives or has his home; a person's
dwelling place . . . ") (emphasis added)).
17. Jernigan v. Capps, 45 S.E.2d 886, 890 (Va. 1947).
18. See Buckheim v. Buckheim, 43 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1950).
19. See Berry v. Wilcox, 62 N.W. 249, 251 (Neb. 1895).

20. 158 P. 490 (N.M. 1916).
21. Id. at 492. See also Perez v. Health & Social Servs., 573 P.2d 689, 692
(N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Berry v. Wilcox, 62 N.W. 249, 251 (Neb. 1895)).
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ipso facto, establish residency. 2
With the requisite intent,
however, a person can elevate mere physical presence into the
status of residency. The controlling factor of intention appears to
focus on the desire to create the status, not on the desire to be
present at the given location. 2' Thus, residency requires two key
elements: a physical presence at a given location and an intent to
remain at the location indefinitely. 4
Intention also plays an instrumental role in determining one's
domicile, which may or may not be the same place as one's
residence. Thus, "residence" and "domicile" are often confused,
and at times used interchangeably. 5 Although similar, the two
are clearly distinct concepts and need to be distinguished from one
another.
When comparing "residence" and "domicile," one senses that
the latter is a stronger, more encompassing concept. At any given
point in time a person may have numerous residences, but can
have only one domicile.26 The essence of the difference was stated
by one court as follows:
'[r]esidence' means living in a particular locality, but 'domicile'
means living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and
permanent home. 'Residence' simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while 'domicile' requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
Again, the element of intent becomes essential. In this
instance, however, intent distinguishes "residency" from "domicile"
on the basis of permanency. Domicile is the chief place a person
considers home, the permanent place to which he or she will
return. Although the residency/domicile distinction is not critical
to notary residency requirement issues, it is nonetheless
worthwhile to keep the two concepts separate to avoid unnecessary
confusion. As a rule, the statutes only speak of "residency" and
never impose "domicile" as a pre-requisite to notary eligibility.
Consequently, people with multiple residences can be notaries in
more than one jurisdiction and are not limited to being
22. See Bourgeois v. Manzella, 17 A.2d 68, 69-70 (N.J. 1940) (maintaining
that "amere physical presence does not establish residency").
23. See Ecker v. Atlantic Refining Co., 222 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1955);
Perry v. Perry, 623 P.2d 513, 515 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding "[o]ne does not
lose one's residence by more physical presence elsewhere unless that presence
is accompanied by intent to abandon the old residence and adopt the new.")
24. See In re Adoption of A.M.M., 949 P.2d 1155, 1159 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
Accord Harrison v. Chessir, 316 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), rev'd
on othergrounds, 320 S.W.2d 814 (1959).
25. See Fuller v. Hofferbert, 204 F.2d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 1953) (stating
"[blecause 'domicile' and 'residence' are usually in the same place, they are
frequently used as if they had the same meaning.")
26. See In re Custody of Booty, 665 So.2d 444, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
27. In re Newcomb's Estate, 84 N.E. 950, 954 (N.Y. 1908).
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commissioned only in their state of domicile.
B. Why Residency?
A fundamental question exists as to why residency
requirements are imposed at all. What legitimate ends are served
by excluding non-residents? Three supporting rationales merit
review on this point.
First, there may be an economic justification for residency
requirements. On a simplistic level, residents pay taxes that are
used to supply services. Limiting access to those services may not
only be fair (i.e., benefits should ensure only to those who pay for
their costs), but may also be necessary (limited resources force
restrictions on both the amount and allocation of services that
actually can be supplied). In this way, residency requirements can
help ensure that entitlements are directed to deserving recipients.
Additionally, residency requirements can serve a convenience
function. For example, residents are allowed to bring suit in their
own state courts for local causes of action. Thus, a resident seeking
legal redress against a non-resident for a local matter does not
need to bring suit in the foreign forum of the non-resident
defendant. The resident's state will have appropriate jurisdiction
over the matter."
Access to the courts is an important right for many
prospective litigants. It can keep costs associated with legal
actions down and allow residents to rely upon home counsel
knowledgeable of local rules. Additionally, imposing residency
requirements can keep dockets clear for matters germane to the
jurisdiction. Divorce actions are illustrative.29 By imposing a
residency requirement for petitioners in these actions, arguably a
state can confine application of its judicial processes to those
actions in which it has a legitimate interest.
Lastly, some residency requirements might be justifiable
under a public "need" argument. For example, requiring certain
public employees to live within a reasonable distance of their
workplace has been approved as appropriate to ensure proper
execution of job duties. 0 However, not all geographic restrictions
28. Long-arm statutes will enforce this right by allowing personal
jurisdiction to be obtained over the non-resident. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-209 (West 1999).
29. See ARNOLD H. RUTKIN, 1 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3.01[1], at
nn.4-6 (1998) (providing a compilation of the residency requirements needed to
constitute a divorce or dissolution of marriage proceedings).
30. See, e.g., Dixon v. City of Perry, 416 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 1992); State ex rel.
Rudolph v. Lujan, 512 P.2d 951 (N.M. 1973). See also Salt Lake City Fire
Fighters v. Salt Lake City, 449 P.2d 239 (Utah 1969) (justifying residency
requirements based on "convenience" and "economic" bases, holding that
persons to whom the city supplies services, may be required to participate in
and contribute support to the service-supplying city-not to the support of
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are permissible.
The restriction must bear a reasonable
relationship to job needs. Thus, requiring a policeman to live
within city limits was held void." On the other hand, imposing
residency requirements for jurors can provide panels that are
representative of local morals and views."2
A residency
requirement for jurists is a laudable goal that relates to the needs
of the public who use the court system.
In sum, residency requirements are justifiable in a variety of
settings as legitimate means to achieve certain objectives. The
three rationales suggested for evaluating this type of restriction,
as applied to select situations, prove this point. However, some
residency requirements are not supported by any of the suggested
rationales. Thus, the central question at hand is on which side of
the ledger do notary residency requirements fall.
III. NOTARY RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS

A. The Rules and Their Roles
For the most part, notaries public are creatures of statute.
Every state has legislation that governs notaries.3 Although some
are more extensive than others, each statute details the
commissioning requirements for its jurisdiction.3' Residency is
addressed by most of the statutes, but in different ways.
The two main approaches to residency requirements are
"residents only" and "non-residents may qualify." The latter group
can be further subdivided into five less well-defined categories.
Each category has a different basis for allowing a non-resident to
be commissioned as a notary public.
The majority of jurisdictions have "resident only" statutes.3 5
other cities).
31. See City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. 1977).

32. See United States v. Ross 468 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 1972).
33. See generally CHARLES N. FAERBER, NOTARY SEAL & CERTIFICATE
VERIFICATION MANUAL (National Notary Association, 3d ed. 1995) (giving an
overview of statutory provisions of each state).

34. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-104 (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 §
4301 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 117.01 (West 1998); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/2-

102 (West 1998).
35. See ALA. CODE § 36-20-2 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 44.50.130 (Michie
1998); CAL. GOVT CODE § 8201 (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-114
(1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4301 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 117.01(1)
(West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-2 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 456-2 (1998);
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/2-102 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 33-16-2-1 (1998); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 423.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
35:191 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 82 (West 1997); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-5-402 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 64-101 (Michie 1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 455:2 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-12-2 (Michie 1998);
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 406.004 (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-3
(1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 441 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 137.01 (West
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Some specifically require that the notary applicant be a resident of
the state,36 while others employ an indirect route to impose the
requirement."
A few go so far as to impose county residency
restrictions as well.38
The balance of states have liberalized the residency
requirements, finding a variety of ways for non-residents to
qualify as notaries. Each of these jurisdictions allows its own
residents to become commissioned. It is the eligibility of nonresidents for notary positions that is the distinguishing
characteristic.
The most common exception to personal residency
requirements is to permit non-residents who are employed or
doing business in the state to become commissioned, regardless of
3
where they call home or their actual state of residenceY.
A
handful of jurisdictions allow non-residents who are employed in
the state to become notaries public if they are residents of
bordering states."' A few jurisdictions allow non-residents who
also have their principal place of business in the state to become
notaries. 4' Two states combine the requirements, only allowing
non-residents of bordering states who have a principal place of
business in the state to become notaries.42 Two states only allow
non-resident attorneys who are admitted to practice in the state to
become notaries.43 One state allows non-residents who have either
a principal place of business, or perform other activities within the

1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-101 (Michie 1998).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.50.130 (Michie 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
117.01(1) (West 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 456-2 (1998).
37. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 64-101 (Michie 1998) (requiring a petition
signed by residents of the county in which the applicant resides).
38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-312 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
423.01 (Baldwin-Banks 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-101 (Michie 1998).
39. See IDAHO CODE § 51-104 (1998) (requiring that an out-of-state notary
be employed or doing business in state); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 18102 (1998) (requiring that notary live or work in state); MO. REV. STAT. §
486.22 (1997) (requiring that an out-of-state notary have a Missouri work
address); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 130 (McKinney 1999) (requiring that an out-ofstate notary have an office or place of business in state); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
1OA-4 (1998) (requiring that an out-of-state notary reside or work in state);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 49, § 1 (1998) (requiring that an out-of-state notary reside or
work in state); VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-4 (Michie 1998) (requiring that an out-ofstate notary be regularly employed in state).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-14-101 (Michie 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.015
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:7-13 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 194.022
(1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.44.020 (1998).
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-94b(2) (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 55.107
(1998); W. VA. CODE § 29C-2-201 (1998).
42. IOWACODE ANN. § 9E.3 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-101 (1998).
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 147.01 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-30-5 (1998).
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state requiring notarial services, to become notaries." Finally, one
state allows non-residents from other specified states to become
notaries,4 5 while another allows non-residents to become notaries if
they are from states that have a reciprocity agreement with the
state in which they seek to be commissioned. '
Notwithstanding the substantial number of exceptions, a
majority of American jurisdictions require the notary to be a
resident of the state in which he or she is commissioned. Do
compelling interests to justify a residency requirement exist, or is
the requirement a historic vestige? Regrettably, there is little
authority on this point.
In support of a residency requirement, the Oregon Attorney
General ruled that "[t]he state has a compelling interest in
ensuring that notaries public are familiar with the people and
processes they serve, that the appointee's character, dependability,
and familiarity with the subject matter can be ascertained, and
that notaries public can be reasonably nontransient [sic]." 7
Ironically, after this opinion was issued, Oregon amended its
notary statute
to allow non-residents to be commissioned as
48
notaries.
In Cook v. Miller,49 a federal district court found that a state
has a legitimate interest in imposing notary residency
requirements to ensure its ability to subpoena notaries. The state
suggested that a notary's testimony might be needed when
"circumstances surrounding the creation of a legal document or
the validity of the notary's seal" were at issue.5"
The four identified reasons in support of notary residency
requirements are to ensure that the notary is familiar with the
people and processes served; can be determined to have the
requisite character, dependability and familiarity with the subject
matter for the position; will be reasonably nontransient; and is
available for service of process."
A review of each reason should demonstrate that the stated
justifications for imposing notary residency requirements are not

44. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 55.107 (1998).
45. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 359.01 (West 1998) (permitting an out-of-state

notary if the person is a resident of Wisconsin, Iowa, North Dakota or South
Dakota, and of a county that shares a boundary with Minnesota).
46. N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-06-01 (1997). Out-of-state notaries must reside
in a county that borders North Dakota and in a state that extends reciprocity
to a notary public who resides in a border county of this state. Id.
47. 37 Op. Att'y. Gen. 1223 (Or. 1976).
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 194.022 (1989).

49. 914 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
50. Id. at 180.
51. The first three reasons are from the Oregon Attorney General's Opinion
and the fourth reason is the view of the Cook court. See supra text
accompanying note 47.
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particularly compelling.
Consider first the desire to have the notary be familiar with
the people served and the processes used in the jurisdiction. If
familiarity with the people is designed to ensure more accurate
identification of signatories, it falls well short of the mark. Today,
the likelihood that a notary will actually know the person who
seeks notarial services is almost nonexistent. Granted, a few
individuals personally known to the notary may well need notarial
assistance, but the lion's share of users in even moderately
populated areas will be strangers to the notary. Legislatures are
aware of this reality and have provided ample ways to overcome
the identification issue by requiring people not personally known
to the notary to provide satisfactory proof of identity."
Adequate knowledge of local processes is an equally feckless
justification for residency requirements. Routinely, notaries are
required to acknowledge their familiarity with applicable rules
when applying for the commission." Additionally, some states go
so far as to require notaries to pass qualifying exams prior to being
commissioned.5' Clearly, better protection against ignorance of
legal processes germane to the office can be afforded without
resorting to residency requirements. Education requirements and
appropriate training satisfy this need.
The second justification listed can be attacked equally as
easily. Whether a resident or a non-resident, the commissioning
authority has to undertake a character investigation of a notary
applicant before granting the commission. There is no basis to
believe non-residents are any less dependable, or of weaker
character, than residents. The concern over knowledge of subject
matter suffers the same defect as the familiarity of process
position. Residency, by itself, does not give any person a better
knowledge or understanding of applicable rules. Education does
that, and as noted above, adequate education can be required of all
applicants regardless of residency status.55
The third justification, non-transience, also is without merit.

52. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10A-3(8)(a) (1998) (requiring a current

document issued by the federal or a state government); OR. REV. STAT. §
194.505(8) (1989) (requiring a document issued by a federal and state
government with the individual's physical description, picture and signature,
or two documents issued by a business, institution or government with the
individual's signature).
53. See, e.g., 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/2-104 (West 1998) (requiring notary
applicant to submit to an oath that includes the following: "[tihat I have
carefully read the notary law of this State"); W. VA. CODE § 29C-2-204 (1998).
54. OR. REV. STAT. § 194.022 (1989).

55. North Carolina requires non-attorney notary applicants to take a
training course. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1OA-4(b)(3) (1998); VA. CODE ANN. §
47.1-11 (Michie 1998) (requiring handbooks be published and made available
to notaries).
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Theoretically, when notaries move out-of-state, they reduce the
number of notaries available to serve the public. Thus, promoting
non-transience helps provide a stable notary population base and
eliminates the negative impact transient notaries can have on the
availability of notarial services.
Unfortunately, the argument is self-defeating.
Limiting
commissions to residents, in turn, limits the overall number of
notaries. By allowing non-residents to become commissioned,
more notaries are available to the public regardless of the number
of transients who never return to render notarial services in the
state. Access to services is decreased, not increased, by imposing
residency
requirements
and
the
measure
becomes
counterproductive.
Finally, the availability for service of process argument is
similarly inadequate to justify residency requirements. Notaries,
like anyone else who transacts business in the state, are subject to
jurisdiction under the long-arm statutes.56 Thus, their availability
for service is not a real issue. Furthermore, non-resident notaries
can be likened to foreign corporations. The latter must submit
themselves to local jurisdiction by appointing a registered agent
for service
of process.57 Notaries could be required to do the
58
same.
Notary residency requirements face constitutional challenges,
as well. Although the Cook court sustained the general validity of
the residency requirement, 9 its final order granted the parties
leave to brief the question "whether the requirement was
unconstitutional as applied to the petitioner."60 The petitioner was
an Ohio resident licensed to practice law in both Ohio and
Michigan. She argued that being precluded from obtaining a
Michigan notary public commission prevented her from practicing
law on equal terms with Michigan attorneys who were also
notaries.
Ms. Cook subsequently convinced the court that the residency
statute as applied to her denied her equal protection and therefore
was unconstitutional.6'
Apparently in response, Michigan
eliminated its "residents only rule" and expanded the pool of
56. In re Newcomb's Estate, 84 N.E. 950, 954 (N.Y. 1908).
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-115-103(e) (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
607.1503(1)(e) (West 1998); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13.15(4) (West 1998).
58. See MO. REV. STAT. § 486.220.2(6) (1997) (requiring non-resident
notaries to register in the state).
59. See Cook v. Miller, 914 F. Supp. 177, 182 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (ruling that

"the residency requirement for notaries public found in [the Michigan statute]
is constitutional on its face").
60. Id.
61. A copy of the unpublished order can be found in CLOSEN, AHLERS,
JACOBS, MORRIS AND SPYKE, NOTARY LAW PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS,
78-80 (National Notary Association 1997).
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eligible notary applicants to anyone who performs activities within
the state that requires notarial services.62
The only other officially addressed instance of a constitutional
challenge to a notary residence requirement was dismissed out of
hand. 3 Thus, it seems that except for those limited cases where
the petitioner can prove unequal protection,
residency
requirements are on terrafirma.
B. DurationalConsiderations
Although perhaps not always justifiable, a notary public
residency requirement is not per se unconstitutional even though,
as seen in Cook, its application to a specific individual may be. A
different issue arises when the statutes establish a minimum term
of residency as a pre-requisite to being commissioned. Such a
durational requirement may be constitutionally suspect on its face.
At the outset, it should be noted that almost all notary
statutes imposing residency requirements are silent as to duration
of the residency. Along this line, it has been ruled that an
applicant need only be a resident for a day in order to satisfy the
statutory residency requirement.6 4
Since there is no official
procedure that must be satisfied in order to become a resident, the
determination of residency is thrown back into the mix of
"presence with requisite intent," discussed earlier." Since it is not
particularly difficult to establish residency in general, satisfying
the residency test of most notary statutes should be fairly easy and
something that is not likely to be challenged.
A number of states, however, specifically require that an
applicant be a resident for a set period of time in order to be
eligible for a notary commission. 6 These durational requirements
can raise constitutional equal protection challenges. When such
restrictions are invalidated, it is because they discriminate against
those in a class of individuals who exercise their right to travel
from state to state. Three leading United States Supreme Court

62. MICH. COMP. LAws § 55.107 (1998).

63. Schockman v. Richards, 1992 WL 21240 (Ohio App. 6th Dist.).
64. N.M. Op. Att'y. Gen. No. 89-16, 1988 WL 407485 (N.M.A.G.)
65. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24.
66. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 312/2-102(d) (West 1998) (requiring 30 days'
residency); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-5-402 (1997) (one year); 57 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 149 (1999) (requiring one year); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-1-3(b) (1998)
(requiring 30 days). A few states may indirectly impose a durational residency
requirement for notary applicants.
These notary statutes require the
applicant to be a "qualified elector," which is a classification that may itself
carry a durational residency requirement. Wittingly or not, this effectively
imposes the same durational obligation on prospective notaries. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 44-06-01 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 29C-2-201 (1998).
67. See Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849); United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966); Crandal v. Nevada, 73 U.S 35, 43-44 (1867)
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cases, Shapiro v. Thomas,' Dunn v. Blumstein" and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County,7 have helped shape the landscape
for constitutional challenges to durational residency requirements.
In Shapiro, the issue was whether welfare benefits could be
withheld from indigents who had not resided in the jurisdiction for
at least one year.7' The Court found that the financial basis for the
restriction (i.e., imposing a waiting period for benefits will deter
those from entering the jurisdiction who will be a continual burden
on the welfare program and jeopardize its continued financial
feasibility) did not justify the discriminatory classification. The
Court said, "if a law has 'no other purpose.., than to chill the
assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to
exercise them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional.''
The Court
also dismissed the state's claim that administrative and other
government objectives justified the waiting period, 7' ruling that
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a
constitutional] right, unless shown to" 7 promote a compelling
government interest, is unconstitutional.
In Dunn, the issue was a durational residency requirement
with respect to voting. Although the Court recognized that
jurisdictions had the authority to regulate voter qualification,7' the
Court held that the jurisdiction "must show a substantial and
compelling
reason
for
imposing
durational
residency
requirements."' The Supreme Court could not see how imposing a
dual durational residency requirement, one for the state and
another for the county, met the test. The state argued that the
requirement would prevent quick invasions into the state by nonresident persons simply for the purpose of voting,77 and that it
would assure an informed electorate.7 ' The Court concluded that
the residency requirement failed to accomplish both goals and
invalidated it.
Finally in Maricopa County, the Court struck down a
durational residency requirement relating to qualification for
county-paid medical care. After concluding that the requirement

(discussing the fundamental right to travel from state to state).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

394 U.S. 618 (1969).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
415 U.S. 250 (1974).
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627 (1969).
Id. at 631 (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).

73. Id. at 633-34. The state argued that the waiting period facilitated
welfare budget planning, provided an objective test for determining residency,

deterred fraud and encouraged individuals to enter the work force quickly. Id.
74. Id. at 634.
75. Id. at 636 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1955)).

76. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
77. Id. at 345.
78. Id. at 360.
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impeded interstate travel, the Court turned its attention to
whether a compelling state interest justified the requirement. As
in Shapiro, the state claimed there were financial and
administrative benefits to support the restriction. And as in
Shapiro, the Court again disagreed."
Not all durational restrictions are unconstitutional. Only
those that create "a classification which operates to penalize those
persons... who have exercised their constitutional right of
migration [and cannot] be justified by a compelling state interest"
are unconstitutional.8 0
For example, in Sosna v. Iowa,8' a
durational residency requirement pertaining to bringing a divorce
action in the jurisdiction passed constitutional muster.
In
upholding the Iowa residency requirement,
the Court
distinguished Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa County, claiming they
were decided on the grounds that budgetary and administrative
justifications did not constitute compelling state interests. 2 In
Sosna, the Supreme Court found that given the potential impact of
a divorce decree on the parties, their property and minor children,
the state does have a compelling interest in seeing that the
petitioner has a "modicum of attachment to the State . . .83
Similar results have been reached when durational residency
requirements for jurors have been challenged."'
It is unlikely a state could demonstrate a compelling state
interest to sustain a durational residency requirement for notaries
public. The justifications for residency requirements themselves
are flimsy at best, and adding the durational aspect only makes
them more difficult to justify. Clearly, durational residency
requirements for notaries public are vulnerable to constitutional
attack.

79. Id.
The Arizona residence requirement for eligibility for non-emergency free
medical care creates an 'invidious classification' that impinges on the
right to interstate travel by denying newcomers 'basic necessities' of life.
Such a classification can only be sustained on a showing of a compelling

state interest.

[The State has] not met [its] heavy burden of

justification, or demonstrated that the state, in pursuing legitimate
objectives, has chosen means which do not unnecessarily impinge on
constitutionally protected interests.

Id.
80. Id. at 258 (separate opinion of Justices Brennan, White and Marshall)
(citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 238 (1970)).
81. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
82. See id. at 406. (reasoning that the "divorce residency requirement is of a

different stripe.")
83. Id. at 406.
84. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138
(Alaska 1977); Williams v. State, 282 So.2d 349 (Ala. 1973).
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ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

If nothing else, it is clear that imposing stringent residency
requirements for notaries public is fraught with uncertainty.
First, the mere fact that so many jurisdictions have walked away
from "resident only" notary eligibility without experiencing any
reported problems makes one wonder if the hold-outs are guarding
something that does not need protection.
Second, the
requirements themselves are infected with constitutional concerns
that make their enforcement problematic. One must wonder
whether notary residency requirements are worthy of retention.
One way to determine the worthiness of the requirement as
applied to notaries is to measure it against the three rationales
presented earlier for all residency restrictions: economic benefit,
convenience and public need.85 This type of analysis should help
assess the efficacy of the requirements. If none of the rationales
support notary residency requirements, then one is left to defend
the restriction only with the justifications suggested for
specifically imposing notary residency requirements. 86 Since these
have already been dismissed as meritless, in order to justify the
residency requirements, one would be forced either to invent new
supporting arguments for them or demonstrate that they serve a
compelling purpose. Since neither of these are likely prospects,
the following analysis should show notary residency requirements
to be unjustifiable.
Notary residence requirements cannot be defended on
economic grounds.
There are not any readily identifiable
additional costs attributable to commissioning non-resident
notaries. If there were, a state would have no difficulty in
surcharging the registration fee for non-resident notaries by an
amount necessary to cover the extra costs associated with
commissioning them. Notary fee differentials based on county of
residence have been approved,87 and there is no reason to believe
state residence differentials would be treated any differently.
Moreover, non-resident notaries do not siphon-off state resources
that would otherwise be directed to residents. Therefore, this
putative justification is neutral on the resource receipt/allocation
issue.
Likewise, the convenience rationale does not support
residency requirements. There are no additional burdens placed
on residents (e.g., clogging of court dockets forcing residents to
suffer delayed justice) by allowing non-resident notaries. Indeed,
85. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing the rationales
of residency restrictions).
86. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text (discussing the
justifications for residency requirements).
87. In re State ex rel. Wootan, 313 So.2d 621 (La. Ct. App. 1975); Manes v.
Goldin, 400 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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if anything, allowing for non-resident notaries provides a
convenience to the general population in that there are more
notaries available to service the public's needs.
Finally, notary residence requirements are not supported by a
public need argument. It cannot be said that resident status will
make a person a better notary than one who is a non-resident.
Knowledge of applicable rules and education requirements are the
same for resident and non-resident notaries alike. It is the proper
enforcement of these requirements, and not the establishment of a
residency eligibility rule, that will best serve the public good.
Perhaps a more appealing and, as yet, undiscussed argument,
for notary residency requirements focuses on notary journals.
Although highly recommended for notaries in all jurisdictions,88
only several states require notaries to maintain journals.89 These
journals, whether or not required, can be likened to public records.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions they must be made available for
public inspection." Given the public or quasi-public nature of such
journals, allowing notaries to be non-residents raises an
interesting question. Should a non-resident notary be allowed to
take a public state record outside of the state?
Generally, public records are to remain with their custodian,
subject to removal in certain instances by authorized individuals.91
There is inherent
Similar rules apply to notary journals. 9
difficulty in allowing a non-resident notary to take the journal to
her residence outside of the jurisdiction. Essentially, official
records are being removed to another state. This poses a serious
theoretical challenge to commissioning non-resident notaries.
But the problem disappears if states require the journal to be
housed at the non-resident notary's place of business in the
jurisdiction. If the non-resident notary does not have a place of
business, then arrangements can be made to designate a trusted
in-state agent to be custodian of the journal. A resident notary
would be a logical choice, but other possibilities exist as well.9"
With some prudently established safeguards, the journal concern
is no longer an issue.

88. NOTARY CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § VIII (1984).
89. ALA. CODE § 36-20-7 (1998); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8206 (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-111 (1998); 57 PA. CONS. STAT. § 161(a) (1999).
90. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-319 (1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-33-5 (1998);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 486.26 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 240.12 (1998); 57 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 161(b) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-16-306 (1998).
91. ALA. CODE § 12-20-25 (1998).

92. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'r. CODE § 8206(d) (West 1999) (making the journal
the exclusive property of the notary).
93. For example, the journal could be kept by the non-resident notary's
registered agent or by a commercial enterprise established for custodial

services.
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There are simply no compelling reasons to impose notary
residency requirements. Indeed, as Internet commerce increases,
there will be a greater need for verification of electronic and digital
signatures. These types of transactions know no home-base like
the commercial dealings of yesteryear. States should be eager to
commission qualified notaries to handle the burgeoning need
generated by cyberspace, regardless of where the notary calls
home.
Understandably, states may not want to open their doors to
any and all comers. There are administrative burdens associated
with processing applications and maintaining notary rosters.
Thus, rules mandating that the notary have some nexus to the
state make sense. Whereas residency is too high a threshold, a
minimum contacts test might be too low.
Establishing a standard that forces the non-resident to
demonstrate a reasonable need to be a notary related to his or her
activities in the state may be a satisfactory middle ground. Such a
test will keep the frivolous applicant away, but will be sufficiently
flexible to avoid unequal protection arguments. Regardless of the
standard chosen, the calculus used to select it should include
consideration of the needs of the public being served-not just the
benefit that will flow to the prospective notary public individually,
or to his or her employer.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prudence dictates that certain licensed authorities satisfy
competency standards. The purpose of this type of requirement is
to protect the public. The general welfare of the public demands
that only qualified professionals be permitted to perform their
duties. Thus, imposing license qualification requirements is both
permissible and sensible.
Notaries public can play an important role in validating many
personal and business transactions. Consequently, there is a
genuine public interest in ensuring that notaries are competent.
It logically follows that notaries, like other professionals licensed
by the state, ought to satisfy qualification requirements. The
public's protection should demand no less. The question at hand,
however, is not whether notaries must meet eligibility
requirements, but instead, what requirements meaningfully
address the goals to be achieved.
It is suggested that strict residency requirements for notaries
are of limited, if any, value in modern society. Such requirements
do not in any way guarantee that higher quality notarial services
will be provided. They can, however, limit the number of available
notaries in any given jurisdiction and thereby reduce the public's
access to notarial services, especially in non-densely populated
areas. Thus, a requirement putatively designed to protect the

19991

Nomadic Notaries

public could in fact work to injure it.
The best way to ensure competent notaries is through
education, not residency, requirements. This is not to say that a
state should commission as a notary someone who has no contacts
with the jurisdiction whatsoever. Some reasonable standard can
be established that ties together the state's interest in regulating
notaries with the public's need for access to notarial services and
an individual's right to become a notary. Something more than
minimum contacts, but far less than actual residency, can satisfy
all concerns.
Given that "resident only" notary statutes can be
unconstitutional as to specific individuals, states that have them
To the extent these
may want to re-think their positions.
jurisdictions have concerns about eliminating their restrictions,
they can take heart in the fact that many states have moved away
from "resident only" notary statutes without much difficulty.
Given the pace and direction of today's transactions and the
impact of cyberspace on tomorrow's, residents of all states may
well need more, and better-qualified, notaries. Restrictions like
residency requirements should not become an impediment to
satisfying that need. The time is ripe to lift state boundaries and
instead welcome nomadic notaries.

